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Abstract 
Over the period 1990–2009, Africa has experienced a distinct and favourable reversal in its growth fortunes 
in stark contrast to its performance in the preceding decades, leading to a variety of hypotheses seeking to 
explain the phenomenon. This paper presents both cross-country and panel-data evidence on the causal 
factors driving the recent turnaround in Africa’s growth and takes the unique approach of disaggregating 
the separate growth impacts of Africa’s bilateral trade with: China, Europe and America. The empirical 
analysis presented in this paper suggests that the primary and most robust causal factors driving Africa’s 
recent growth turnaround are private sector- and foreign direct investment. Although empirical evidence of 
the role of bilateral trade openness in Africa’s recent growth emerges within a fixed effect estimation 
setting, these results are not as robust when endogeneity and other issues are fully accounted for. Among 
the three major bilateral partners, Africa’s bilateral trade with China has been a relatively important factor 
spurring growth on the continent and especially so in resource-rich, oil producing and non-landlocked 
countries. The econometric results are not as supportive of growth-inducing effects of foreign aid. These 
findings emerge after applying  a variety of panel data specifications to the data, including the recent fixed 
Effects Filtered (FEF) estimator introduced by Pesaran and Zhou (2014) and the dynamic panel 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which allows for endogeneity between trade and 
growth.  
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1. Introduction 
The idea that trade openness is an important causal, contributing factor towards the promotion of 
economic development and growth has for long been debated by economists and policy makers. 
Since Ricardo’s critique of the Corn Laws in the early 1800s, the debate has not waned. The key 
argument for free trade, as proposed by Ricardo, and dating at least as far back as Adam Smith, is 
that nations could improve their incomes and long run growth rates by specializing in the export of 
goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage. With trade occurring between 
nations, resources are more efficiently allocated, output is increased and feasible sets of 
consumption possibilities are expanded, leading to static gains from trade. Modern trade theories, 
such as those propounded by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Romer (1986), emphasize the 
dynamic gains from trade that constantly shift countries’ production possibility frontiers outwards. 
Greater trade openness also encourages private entrepreneurship, attracts foreign investment, 
fosters learning-by-doing, and encourages acquisition of knowledge and new technologies thus 
leading to increased productivity and economic growth1.  
Pro-growth trade arguments, however, can be rebutted if it can be established that market and 
institutional imperfections prevail, which may cause openness to induce: i) the underutilization of 
human and physical capital and natural resources, ii) the concentration of economic production in 
extractive economic activities or iii) specialization away from technologically advanced, 
increasing return sectors. Endogenous growth models presented by Eicher (1999), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991); Lee (1993) and Young (1991) emphasize these more pessimistic possibilities2. 
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East Asia arguably provides an example of how trade can positively affect growth. Outward 
oriented and export-led growth policies implemented in the 1960s and 1970s have hailed success 
in many East Asian countries and contributed to their significant progress and development over 
the past three decades. Figure 1 confirms the increased level of Asia’s openness since 1970, where 
openness is measured as the total value of trade (imports + exports) normalized by the value of 
GDP. Through greater exposure to international markets, Asian countries became increasingly 
competitive and more integrated within the global economy, making a swift move from exports of 
raw materials to exports involving more dynamic, higher value added and technologically 
advanced products (Hammouda, 2004). 
 In contrast, the African experience has been bleak. Following the failure of inward-looking trade 
policies implemented in the 1960s and early 1970s, many African nations turned to greater 
external openness (Hammouda, 2004). Unlike their East Asian counterparts however, African 
countries continued to experience sluggish growth and became increasingly marginalised in the 
1980s. Africa, then tagged the “hopeless continent”3, registered negative real GDP per-capita 
growth rates, averaging 0.8% per annum over the decade beginning in 1980. Figure 2 shows 
regional trends in real GDP growth per capita between 1971 and 2010. The figure highlights the 
relatively sub-par real per capita GDP growth performance of Africa until the 1990’s. By this 
time, as displayed in Figure 3, the region was surpassed by Asia in terms of real GDP per capita - 
a rough but useful proxy of average living standards.  
The fact that Africa continued to lag behind other regions despite comprehensive trade reforms 
and other efforts to emulate export-led growth models prompted some researchers to reconsider 
the trade-growth relationship. Many studies subsequently highlighted the contingent aspect of the 
trade-growth link, implying that trade openness would lead to growth only if appropriate 
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economic, social, institutional and political conditions are in place (Dufrénot et al., 2010). These 
include factors like governance, economic policies, and the extent of bureaucracy and competition 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2003; North, 1990) and the growth of inputs such as capital, labour, education 
and infrastructure (Krugman, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 The mid-1990s marked the beginning of a positive reversal in Africa’s growth fortunes. In real 
GDP per capita growth terms, Africa made a noticeable leap from the negative real (per capita) 
growth in GDP to a more reassuring 2% average rate per annum (see Figure 2). In the first decade 
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Figure 2. Trends in Real Growth  per Capita by Region  
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Figure 3. Trends in Real GDP per Capita by Region  
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Figure 1: Regional Openness 1970 -2010 
;

of the 21st century, real GDP growth jumped to 5% per annum on average, proving resilient 
throughout the turbulent mid-2000s- despite the global financial crisis- outstripping GDP growth 
in the EU and the US.  
The literature on African growth identifies a boom in commodity prices as a key driver spurring 
the region’s recent economic success. This explanation, however, loses its appeal in the face of 
evidence that many non-resource dependent countries have also made remarkable strides in 
economic growth over the period (AfDB, 2012); suggesting that growth in Africa stands on a 
more diversified base, with sectors other than the natural resource sectors gaining importance 
(McKay, 2013). Researchers also concur that countries across the continent have made significant 
improvements in macroeconomic management, strengthening of political institutions, investment 
in physical and human capital and opening up domestic markets to international trade (AfDB, 
2012; Rodrik, 2014) as Figure 1 shows. Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) on the other hand, posits a 
“growth by destination” hypothesis suggesting that the export destination of Africa’s exports, and 
in particular its growing exports to China, have been instrumental in its recent growth.  
This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the main factors driving the recent growth 
turnaround on the continent using an empirical approach. The role of trade is given added 
prominence in this study, through the disaggregation of Africa’s trade openness, as measured by 
the normalized value of trade; the total value of imports and exports divided by the value of GDP, 
with its major regional trading partners: US, EU, China and the rest of the world (ROW). By 
adopting this approach, the paper provides empirical analysis of the growth by destination 
hypothesis. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the shifts in Africa’s bilateral 
trade openness over the period 1990 -2009. Section 3 then provides the contextual setting with 
regards to key developments concerning bilateral trade arrangements between the EU, USA and 
China and Africa. Section 4 then outlines the empirical strategy – specifying an appropriate model 
along with estimation methods and frameworks. Section 5 addresses details of the dataset used 
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within this study after which Sections 6 and 7 provide estimation results; with the latter section 
presenting empirical results from robustness tests performed using the empirical model. A 
discussion of the findings within the context of the empirical literature is provided in Section 8 
after which Section 9 summarizes the findings and then concludes by making a few policy 
suggestions based on the empirical findings. 
2. Africa’s Shift in Trading Partners 
Figure 1, also reveals a marked increase in Africa’s trade openness since 1990. Beneath the 
surface of the perceptible buoyancy in Africa’s trade flows as shown in the Figure however, was a 
significant shift in the structure of Africa’s trade by trading partner. Conclusive evidence of this is 
provided in Figure 4. The first three panels of the figure plot individual African country’s trade 
openness by major trading partner (China, US and the EU) for the two years marking the 
beginning and end of the review period: 1990 and 2009. African countries maintaining exactly the 
same trade openness in 1990 as in 2009 with the respective major trading partner will be located 
on the 45-degree line superimposed onto each graph. Countries within the scatterplot appear closer 
to the axis denoting the year in which the trade share was of a greater magnitude.  
In panel (a), the cluster of points near the x-axis highlights the fact that China’s trade penetration 
in Africa was relatively low in the early 1990’s. By the end of the review period, however, there 
appears to have been a marked increase in China’s trade with most African countries, as most 
countries in the scatterplot lie above the 45-degree reference line. The greatest inroads appear to 
have been made in natural resource exporters such as Guinea, Togo, Benin, Mozambique, Angola 
and Gabon. Panel (b), which displays bilateral trade openness between African countries and the 
US, shows mixed results: the reference line approximately splits the sample into two halves, with 
most points remaining very close to the reference line. This implies that the value of bilateral trade 
normalized by GDP remained relatively stable between Africa and US between the years 1990 and 
2009. 
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Countries which registered the most significant increases in trade openness with the US over the 
sample period were Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Malawi. On the other hand, noticeable declines 
in trade openness with the US have occurred in Ghana, Angola and Mozambique. It is interesting 
that, during this same period, China has made inroads into the latter two countries -possibly 
implying competition for markets between major trading partners and a possible direct pivot away 
from America toward China in trading ties and allegiances.  
 
 
 
     Figure 4: (a) Individual Country Trade Shares with China 1990 and 2009 (b) Individual Country Trade Shares with US 1990 
and   2009 (c) Individual Country Trade Shares with EU 1990 and 2009 (d) Value of  Bilateral Trade by Major Trading 
Partner 1990 -2012 . Source: IMF  
 
Panel (c) brings into stark relief the relative decline in Africa’s bilateral trade openness with the 
EU; especially in countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Republic of the Congo, Sierra 
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Leone, Chad and Comoros and Zambia. However, despite the apparent decline in trade openness 
in many countries, there were some countries in which bilateral trade with EU actually increased 
over the period such as Togo, Guinea, Benin, South Africa, Botswana and Central African 
Republic between 1990 and 2009. Panel (d) depicts times series of the bilateral value of trade in 
billions of US dollars (at current prices) between Africa’s key trading partners over the period 
1990 - 2012. The panel confirms Busse et al.’s (2016) observation of significant growth in the 
value of bilateral trade between Africa and China over the period, with the rate of growth 
increasing noticeably since the early 2000’s, which coincides with China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organisation4. The growth continues after a brief, though noticeable, setback during the 
international financial crisis. Bilateral trade with the US, on the other hand, started off at a 
relatively higher initial level in 1990 compared to the value of trade with China and thereafter 
exhibited a trend increase in subsequent years until the financial crisis, during which the value of  
Africa’s bilateral trade with the US registered a sharp and noticeable decline. The post-crisis 
recovery in bilateral Africa-US trade has however been less impressive than China’s, with the 
value of trade in 2012 eventually settling in 2012 at below pre-crisis levels. The panel also reveals 
some growth in bilateral trade, albeit less pronounced, between Africa and other major European 
trading partners such as such as France, Germany, UK and Italy (bilateral trade with Spain and 
Netherlands and Sweden, though not shown, tend to follow a similar pattern) with the effects of 
the financial crisis also being observed to varying degrees in these series.  
3. The Role of Trade Agreements 
The remarkable coincidence of the reversal of Africa’s subpar growth outcomes since the mid-
1990’s with its increased openness to China during that same period has re-ignited the debate 
regarding the role of bilateral trade and trading agreements in general, in stimulating growth on 
the continent. Drummond and Liu (2013) directly link Chinese domestic investment which has 
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fuelled its demand for minerals, farm products, timber and oil from all over the world including 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). To fully assess such arguments, the historical context of trading 
agreements is now explored. 
 
3.1 Africa’s Relationship with the European Union 
Africa shares a longstanding relationship with the European Union, dating back to 1957 with the 
Treaty of Rome. The Lomé Convention signed in 1975 and its successive rounds offered African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) unilateral preferential access to EU markets. Deemed as a 
breach of the WTO ‘most-favoured nation’ principle, the convention was replaced by the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2000, which set the ground for progressive, reciprocal but asymmetric market 
access, where the EU provided full, duty free market access to ACP countries that ratify Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and commit to progressively open their markets to EU (Ramdoo 
and Bilal, 2014). Meanwhile, to assist the integration of all least developed countries (LDC’s) into 
the global economy, the EU launched the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative in 2001 as an 
extension of its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) scheme to meet the needs of least 
developed countries (worldwide) and grant full, duty- and quota-free access to the EU for all their 
exports with the exception of arms and armaments.  
EU’s non-reciprocal trade preferences aim at (i) increasing export volumes for developing 
countries thereby boosting their export earnings, and (ii) facilitating export diversification 
(Persson and Wilhelmsson; 2016).  Evidence from previous research, namely Sapir (1981), 
Oguledo and Macphee (1994), Nilsson (2002), Péridy (2005), Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007), 
Thelle et al. (2015) among others, point to a general agreement of progress in achieving the first 
goal. Cirera et al. (2016) also find that unilateral preferences have been effective at increasing 
exports to the EU both as a result of the direct effect of lower tariffs and positive preference 

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margin. Similarly, European Commission (2015) find robust positive effects of EU’s GSP 
preferences and EBA program on developing countries’ export, with LDCs benefitting the most.  
The literature, however, takes a more dissenting view when African countries are singled out. 
Manchin (2006) notes that despite benefiting from one of the most generous trade preference 
schemes of the EU providing free access for 95 per cent of their exports, it is widely accepted that 
ACP countries failed to take advantage of their preferential status and performed poorly in 
comparison with other developing countries. EU’s generous unilateral trade preferences also 
appear to have an adverse impact on export diversification in the region. Persson and Wilhelmsson 
(2016) notes that while the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) increased the ranges of 
export products for developing countries, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) preferences 
granted between 1989-2007 (Lomé IV-Cotonou) may have resulted in increased specialization.  
Focussing on African LDCs, UNECA (2015) notes that the proportion of manufactured goods 
exported by these countries to their main partners, including the EU, is extremely small and 
showed no improvement over 2000–2012. Most exports were concentrated in fuels and to a lesser 
extent ores and metals, reinforcing the view that trade preferences have failed to promote 
manufactured exports and export diversification for LDCs in Africa.  
Complex and restrictive rules of origin are often identified as a key reason limiting the 
effectiveness of trade regimes on beneficiary countries (European Commission, 2015). Rules of 
origin are intended to avoid trade deflection especially in the increasingly globalised business 
environment with supply chains spanning various countries. Minimum local content requirements 
and “sufficient processing” are among the most frequently applied criteria.  UNECA (2015) 
underlines the mismatch between African countries’ productive capacity and the trade 
preferences’ rules of origin as a potential source of Africa’s failure to take advantage of trade 
preferences. UNECA (2015) further cites the example of EU’s GSP requirement of a “double-
transformation” process for textile and clothing products for non-LDCs, where woven yarn must 

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be transformed into fabric and then fabric made into clothing. Countries that rely on imported 
fabric are thus barred from enjoying preferences under the EU’s GSP.  The level of restrictiveness 
of the rules of origin determines the utilisation of preferences (Manchin, 2006).  
 
3.2 Africa’s Relationship with the United States 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), passed by the US congress in 2000 in a bid 
further trade relations between USA and Sub-Saharan Africa, lies at the heart of US-African 
engagement on trade over the past two decades. In addition to the duty free, quota free access for 
about 5000 product lines under the US Generalised System of preferences, AGOA-eligible 
countries are granted preferential access to an additional 1800 product lines (Cook and Jones; 
2015). Another pivotal provision of AGOA is the ‘Apparel provision”. While garments are 
excluded form the GSP they qualify for AGOA preferences subject to a special apparel visa 
system and specific rules of origin. These rules of origin emulated the “triple transformation” 
principle already prevalent in other US preferential trade agreements such as NAFTA and 
Caribbean Basin Initiative Preferential treatment, and can be applied to apparel assembled in one 
or more AGOA eligible country from US fabrics, which in turn are made from US yarn. African 
apparel made from fabric made in another beneficiary African country is acceptable on the 
condition that it is derived from US yarn and not exceeding an applicable percentage (Portugal-
Perez, 2007). AGOA also makes provision for a more relaxed rule of origin for lesser developed 
countries. Duty-free access was granted to their apparel irrespective of origin of fabric used to 
produce it, in line with a “single-transformation” requirement 
A number of studies have established a positive impact of AGOA on SSA exports. Collier and 
Venables (2007) and Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) find that AGOA promoted exports of apparel to 
the US. Moreover, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) find that AGOA had a large and robust 

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impact on US imports for apparel and manufactured products and a smaller but significant impact 
on agricultural products.  
In contrast, Nilsson (2007) and Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) did not find significant trade-creating 
effects for AGOA. The two studies however employed differing levels of aggregation and 
focussed on different product groups. Nilsson (2007) explored the effects on total exports while Di 
Rubbo and Canali focussed on agri-products. Similarly, with the use of gravity models Mueller 
(2008) and Seyoum (2007) find that AGOA has had no significant impact on overall exports from 
SSA.  
In terms of the lesser-studied aspect of export diversification under AGOA, UNECA (2015) and 
Eicher and Kuenzel (2016), notes that like other preferential schemes, AGOA has not helped 
Africa to diversify its export products, with energy commodities still constituting the bulk of 
AGOA eligible countries’ exports to the US. On the other hand, Cook and Jones (2015) suggest 
that AGOA contributed to export diversification, specifically through its apparel provision. 
Countries that are eligible for the AGOA apparel provision not only export more apparel products, 
but also export more non-apparel products to the USA. 
3.3 Africa’s Relationship with China 
China’s engagement with Africa, initially based on diplomatic and political links, entered a new 
phase following China’s opening up in 1978. At that time, China’s share of world GDP was a 
mere 1.75%5 and remained more or less the same until 1990. Over the review period, 1990-2009, 
China’s share of the world economy grew to 8.5%; a remarkable increase. Driven by the growing 
appetite for resources to fuel its prospering economy, China gradually turned to Africa. Sino-
African trade, therefore, rapidly intensified since the start of the new century, growing by an 
average annual rate of 27% over the period 2001-2014 compared to 17% in the period 1990-2000 
(Lakatos et al., 2015). In 2009, China accounted for around 15% of SSA’s total trade compared to 
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roughly 5% in 2000 (Pigato and Tang, 2015). This trade relationship is however asymmetric, 
Africa being of relatively less importance to China as a trading partner. SSA’s share in Chinese 
total trade reached only 3% in 2009.  Africa’s exports to China are heavily concentrated in oil and 
non-oil natural resources while its imports are more diversified comprising both consumer and 
capital goods6 (Wang, 2007; Broadman, 2007; Renard 2011; Pigato and Tang, 2015). This 
provides an interesting contrast to export baskets destined for the EU and US markets in that they 
also include a significant share of manufactures, in particular textiles and apparel.  
The heightened trade between China and Africa has sparked the interest of many scholars, keen to 
understand its impact on the continent’s growth. Using a panel of 43 African countries over 1991-
2010, Busse et al. (2016) report that African economies exporting natural resources have 
benefitted from positive terms of trade effects from Sino-African trade but other economies have 
experienced displacement effects as a result of bilateral trade with China. Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) 
highlights the “growth by destination hypothesis” distinguishing between the effects of African i) 
imports from and ii) exports to China, while controlling for export concentration and openness to 
trade. Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) suggests that while exports to China do not affect growth 
unconditionally, export concentration enhances the growth effects. Exports to developed countries 
(defined as rest of the world, excluding China and Africa) on the other hand, are linked through an 
inverted U-shaped relationship while imports from China were found to have growth-enhancing 
effects.  
China first granted preferential market access for 190 products from designated African lesser- 
developed nations in 2005 and more than doubled the product coverage three years later, offering 
an average preference margin of 10.4%. Using a simple ‘implicit transfer’ calculation, Minson 
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(2008) estimates the economic value of the scheme to be $10 million per year, spread across 30 
countries. Nations exporting primary products and simple manufactures such as sesame seeds, 
cocoa, beans, leather and cobalt stand to gain from the Chinese trade preference.  The benefits of 
freer access to the Chinese market could nonetheless be offset by potential competition from other 
Asian LDCs enjoying the same preferences. Non-tariff measures imposed by China to safeguard 
health, environment and natural security are also likely to undermine preference margins. It is 
reported that, in general, 6.5% China’s tariff lines are subject to such import restrictions and at 
least two of the 440 items listed for preferential treatment are affected (Minson, 2008). Raw 
cotton, a major export commodity of many African nations, was also subject to an MFN rate of 
40%. This could, however, offer substantial potential for value added processing and 
diversification provided the required capacities are in place, more so as 49 products on the 
preference-receiving list including thread, yarn and textiles, were not being actively exported 
(ibid). Minson (2008) concludes that notwithstanding preferences granted by China were 
thoughtfully tailored to Africa’s exporting capacity, the economic impacts of the scheme are likely 
to be modest and more of a symbolic importance. This sentiment is echoed by Co and Dimova 
(2014), who find that the preferential treatment led to some export diversification and moving up 
the value chain, with effects differing significantly across beneficiary countries. They also note 
that China’s market access arrangement did not enhance export competitiveness of African 
exports in the Chinese market. These findings are not surprising considering that the additional 
duty-free products only represent 1.2% of African exports to China; the bulk of African exports 
(90%), in particular oil and minerals, already entered China duty free before the scheme was 
implemented (Minson, 2008).    
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Background 
Establishing the empirical relationship between trade openness and growth is fraught with 
challenges (Chang et al.; 2009). Some papers have found a positive effect which varies in intensity 
;

(Dollar, 1992; Edwards, 1998; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Lee; 2005, Sachs and Warner, 1995a) 
while others have cast doubt on those results (Harrison, 1996; Loayza et al., 2005; Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 2001) on methodological grounds including endogeneity. 
There is also a broad literature on other determinants of growth in which many variables have 
been employed in growth regressions as explanatory variables7. In fact, Durlauf et al. (2005), 
argues that economic theory does not specify the exact mechanism driving growth and identifies 
over 140 proxies of growth determinants employed in various empirical studies. The neoclassical 
model due to Solow emphasizes the role of investment in causing growth. Romer’s (1986) 
endogenous growth model argues along similar lines but adding that private investment positively 
contributes to technological change, ensuring increasing returns to scale and growth in the steady-
state. Many empirical studies have featured foreign direct investment emphasizing the role of 
skills, financial development and bridgeable technology gap (Findlay, 1978; Doucouliagos et al., 
2010; Li and Liu, 2005; Gunby et al., 2017; Alfaro et al., 2010; Chang and Mendy, 2012; 
Cipollina et al., 2012; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Hanson, 2001). 
 Foreign aid has also been identified as an important determinant of economic growth (Burnside 
and Dollar, 2004; Brückner, 2013; Brückner, 2013; Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi, 2012; 
Fayissa and El-Kaissy, 1999; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Lensink and White, 2000; Stoneman, 
1975) while others provide evidence to the contrary (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009; Easterly, 
2003a; Easterly, 2003b; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004; Kosack, 2003; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008, 2011; Roodman, 2007; Easterly and Williamson, 2011). More recently the 
literature has emphasized the role of institutions as a major factor influencing economic growth 
and development with some authors arguing for the primacy of institutions over other deep 
determinants of growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003a; Rodrik, 2004; 
Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2005). 
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4.2 Empirical Model 
This paper adopts an empirical model of economic growth in Africa, entertaining a model along 
the lines of Mankiw et al. (1992) written as follows: 
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In equation (1), the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively. The 
dependent variable Growth is the logged difference of real GDP per capita; initGDP represents the 
logged value of 1990 real GDP per capita for each country within the sample. As a consequence of 
using the logged difference of real GDP per capita as the dependent variable, one observation is 
dropped for each country leaving 333 observations in the estimation sample. The variables 
TO_CH, TO_EU, TO_US, and TO_ROW measure the logged bilateral trade openness of each 
African country with major trading partners: China, the EU, US and rest of the world (ROW). 
Trade openness is measured as the sum total of imports and exports divided by GDP with each 
bilateral partner (USA, China, EU and ROW) in each country year (Edwards, 1992, 1998; Frankel 
and Romer, 1999; Ulaan, 2015, Idris et al. 2016). The normalization of trade values by GDP is a 
standard treatment reflecting the standard formulation of the neoclassical model of growth stated 
(in per capita terms) while also acknowledging importance of “size” for economic growth as 
emphasized by Alesina et al. (2005). Here it is important to note that trade openness variable, as 
specified, is an outcome variable, measuring is trade value by partner region normalized by GDP 
and not trade policy per se. The chosen measure of trade openness therefore allows us to test 
whether normalized bilateral trade values from Africa’s major regional partners have contributed 
to the recent growth turnaround. Although this paper has explored the policy context in Section 3, 
the trade openness measure specified is inherently too crude a measure to make bold statements 
regarding the effect of policies over the period. On the other hand a major advantage of the 
&

measure used is that: i) it is widely used and therefore allows for comparability with many 
previous studies ii) it allows us to identify whether bilateral trade outcomes have affected growth.  
Alternative measures of trade openness are far from perfect. Various authors have also noted that 
tariff-based measures of trade openness, for example, would be too narrow and would also limit 
the sample size8 (Busse and Koeniger, 2015; Gervais,2015). 
 It is also worth noting that using the definition of bilateral regional trade openness employed 
within this study does not introduce high pairwise correlations between trade openness proxies at 
the country-level or within the full sample as will be shown in Tables 2a and 2b. This is due to the 
normalization of trade values by GDP in each country year which removes implicit linear 
relationship between the values of bilateral trade openness when these values are summed across 
bilateral trading partners9. Secondly, while it is intuitively appealing  to consider that increasing 
trade openness to one bilateral partner must necessarily decrease trade openness to another due to 
supply-side constraints (for example, resource and technological constraints), this hypothesis does 
not hold up to scrutiny. In fact, bilateral trade openness as measured could increase across all trade 
partners simultaneously. For example, a simple fall in nominal GDP which does not affect the 
external sector (tradeable goods sector) could achieve this result. Conversely, a favourable change 
in the terms of trade for a good exported to all trading partners, ceteris paribus, could cause 
openness to all bilateral partners to increase. More generally, therefore, the bilateral trade 
openness measure simply captures the broad trade policy stance between African countries and 
their trading partners; thus summarizing a complex mix of policy, demand and supply, and overall 
economic conditions between each African country and their trading partners within each period10.  
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The term CV in equation (1) represents all other control variables which are included in order 
control for the effect of trade on growth. A complete list of control variables are found in Table 1. 
The choice of variables for inclusion under CV pays due attention to two key considerations: 1) 
their importance in the theoretical and empirical literature as determinants of economic growth 
and 2) their potential for affecting the degree of trade openness. The control variables used to 
estimate equation (1) are both time-varying and time-invariant in nature. Key time varying 
regressors included within our specification are i) private sector investment to GDP ratio, (ii) 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP ratio and iii) AID to GDP ratio. We also include inflation 
as a simple proxy of financial stability. Following Chang et al. (2009), we calculate inflation as 
the absolute deviation of the inflation rate from 3% in logs. The other time–invariant control 
variable is oilprod- a binary indicator variable which takes a value of 1 for oil- producing African 
countries.  
 
The specification also includes a conflict binary indicator, which varies across both country and 
time and indicates years in which there was a conflict within the African country in question. To 
capture the degree of institutionalized democracy (autocracy or democracy) within each African 
country, we use the polity2 measure. Increases in polity2 imply an increase in institutionalized 
democracy over the sample period and varies by country and over time. The terms % and &  in 
equation 1 capture time and country specific fixed effects respectively. Unless otherwise stated, 
binary year indicator variables are employed in all regressions and robust standard errors are 
utilized in order to make our statistical inferences and the conclusions drawn from the model 
robust in the presence of potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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4.3 Endogeneity 
To varying degrees, previous studies have sought to address concerns regarding the problem of 
endogeneity between explanatory variables, such as trade openness and economic growth in the 
panel regression framework (Harrison, 1996; Loayza et al., 2005; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001 
Gervais, 2015). However the endogeneity problem is not confined to bilateral trade variables. 
León-Gonzáles and Montolio (2015, Brückner 2013) comment that the endogeneity problem is 
particularly relevant in empirical studies looking at the impact of foreign aid on growth in 
developing countries11. Li and Liu (2005) also identify endogeneity between FDI and economic 
growth over specific periods. 
In addition to presenting baseline fixed effect panel data estimations of the model’s coefficients a 
new estimator contributed by Pesaran and Zhou (2014) which specifically enables the estimation 
of static panel data models with time invariant, exogenous regressors such as the “oil prod” 
variable is employed. The endogeneity between trade openness and economic growth is directly 
addressed using two common strategies (i) the panel two-stage least squares estimator is used to 
provide coefficient estimates which controls for the endogeneity in bilateral trade openness 
variables and (ii) system GMM estimator which also provides for the endogenously of other 
explanatory variables.  
 
Two instrument sets are used for the two-stage least squares estimation: (i) first-differenced 
bilateral trade openness (ii) trade openness to each African country measured from the perspective 
of the bilateral, regional partners US, China, EU and the rest of the world. Dollar and Kraay 
(2004) provide theoretical arguments in order to justify the use of first-differenced bilateral trade 
openness as an instrument or proxy for bilateral openness. They argue, with some merit, that 
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focussing on the change rather than the level of the trade to GDP ratio controls for initial 
conditions such that any observed increases in the differenced trade/GDP ratio can therefore be 
taken to be the result of policies which foster openness12. It should be noted however that, this 
theoretical justification remains valid only as long as the effects of the initial conditions are 
assumed to be the same in every period. The bilateral trade-openness to each African country 
measured from the perspective of the trading partner is slightly ad-hoc. It exploits the ambiguity in 
the definition of the trade openness in the literature and has been employed in earlier papers 
(Leamer, 1993; Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995). Both instruments satisfy the prerequisite of being 
highly relevant in a statistical sense as evidenced by examining the results of the first stage 
regressions. On the other hand, the fact that both instrumental variable specifications are exactly 
identified precludes the application of tests for appropriateness of the moment conditions within 
the two-stage least squares framework.  
 
To-step system generalized method of moments (GMM), however, provides a framework which 
accounts for variable endogeneity while also lending itself to tests for over-identifying restrictions 
involving the instruments (the instrument appropriateness)13. For the dynamic estimation of the 
model, the standard convention proposed by Roodman (2009a) was followed: for variables 
predetermined to be not strictly exogenous such as the lagged dependent variable (lagged GDP 
growth per capita) lags 1 or longer were used, whereas for exogenous variables such as bilateral 
trade openness and Aid to GDP ratio, lags two or longer were included within the instrument 
matrix. Not all previous lags were used during estimation. 
 
Using two-step GMM to tackle the problem of endogeneity is not without its pitfalls. One issue of 
concern is the number of instruments used within the estimation. Including all variables mentioned 
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within the literature as possibly endogenous (along with all the previous lags of these variables) 
simultaneously during estimation would lead to a proliferation of instruments which can overfit 
endogenous variables and fail to remove their endogenous components (Roodman 2009a; 
Roodman 2009b). For this reason the results presented in this paper treat bilateral trade openness 
and AID to GDP ratio as instruments in all specifications, since the endogeneity of aid is greatly 
emphasized within the literature. It is worth noting however, that the results remain qualitatively 
robust to alternative specifications of endogenous variables. The “too many instruments” problem 
is of particular concern when the empirical model is estimated on a subsample of countries- such 
as is performed in Section 7 of the paper. In all cases the instrument count adheres to the ‘rule-of-
thumb’ proposed by Roodman (2009a and 2009b) which states that: in every regression the 
instrument count should be less than the number of countries within the sample (or subsample). 
When this method proves to be binding for sub-samples that involve relatively few countries the 
principal components method (Kapetanios and Marcellino 2010; Bai and Ng 2010; Mehrhoff 
2009) is used to extract the key components of the instrument matrix to further reduce the 
instrument count.  
 
5. Data, Measurement and Sources 
 
Real GDP per capita data used for the dependent variable and initial income variable are obtained 
from Penn World Tables version 8 (with 2005 used as the base year). The bilateral trade and GDP 
data used to construct the trade openness variable between each African country and the major 
trading partners EU, China and the US are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and World Development Indicators (WDI) Database 
respectively. Private sector investment data are taken from the Penn World Table 8 while foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and aid (AID) data are both compiled from the WDI dataset. Data used to 
construct the conflict indicator was obtained from Version 4-2009 of the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (PRIO) dataset.  
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions, Summary Statistics and List of Countries. 
Variable  Source Unit of 
Measurement 
Mean Overall 
standard 
deviation 
Between 
standard 
deviation 
Within 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum  Sample 
Size 
Real GDP 
per 
Capita 
Penn World 
Tables 8 
Log of GDP 
PPP US$(Yr. 
2005) 
7.3013 0.9043 0.8547 0.3241 5.429 9.4311  370 
Initial 
GDP(1990) 
Penn World 
Tables 8 
Log of GDP 
PPP US$ (Yr. 
2005) 
7.2313 0.8337 0.8441  0 5.7084 9.011 370 
Trade 
Openness to 
China 
DOT/WDI Log of  Trade 
Openness 
-4.594 1.817 1.359 1.224 -13.195 -0.8498 370 
Trade 
openness to 
USA 
DOT/WDI Log of Trade 
Openness 
-3.753 1.6514 1.5302 0.665 -11.5129 -0.5815 370 
Trade 
Openness to 
EU 
DOT/WDI Log of Trade 
Openness 
-1.652 0.6252 0.559 0.2932 -3.3765 -0.1791 370 
Trade 
Openness 
To ROW 
DOT/WDI Log of Trade 
Openness 
-1.881 0.9565 0.8294 0.4937 -6.908 0.6208 370 
Private 
Sector 
Investment 
Penn World 
Tables 8. 
Share of GDP 0.1348 0.1868 0.1368 0.1289 -1.1898 0.9101 370 
Population 
Growth 
WDI Log of Percent 
growth 
0.7951 0.75001 0.449 0.6049 -4.605 2.037 370 
FDI to GDP 
ratio 
WDI  Share of GDP 0.0331 0.07454 0.0516 0.07617 -0.07217 0.8695 370 
AID to GDP 
ratio 
WDI Share of GDP 0.1152 0.112 0.0773 0.0815 00012 1 370 
oilprod African 
Petroleum 
Producers 
Organisation 
Indicator 
Variable 
0.3784 0.486 0.4917 0 0 1 370 
Conflict  UCDP/PRIO 
Armed 
Conflict 
Dataset 
Codebook 
Indicator 
Variable 
0.2892 0.454 0.3733 0.2649 0 1 370 
Polity2 PolityIV- Integer Variable  -0.1622 5.1997 4.273 3.037 -9 10 370 
inflation WDI Log of absolute 
deviation from 
3 
1.533 1.3917 1.006 0.9742 -5.046 7.603 370 
 
Countries: 
Oil  Producers: 
 
Angola –AGO-RR -Central, Benin –BEN- West, Cote d’ Ivoire-CIV-RR- West, Cameroon-CMR-RR -Central, Congo Rep.-COG-RR -
Central , Egypt, Arab Rep. –EGY-North, Gabon –GAB-Central, Ghana –GHA-RR- West, Equatorial Guinea –GNQ-RR-Central, 
Mauritania-MRT-RR -West, Niger –NER-RR-LL -West, Nigeria –NGA-RR -West, Chad –TCD-RR-LL, South Africa –ZAF-South. 
 
Other: 
Burundi-BDI-East, , Burkina Faso – BFA-West-LL, Botswana-BWA-LL-South, Central African Republic-CAF-RR-LL-Middle, 
Comoros –COM-East, Djibouti –DJI-North, , Ethiopia –ETH-LL-East, Guinea –GIN-RR-West ,Kenya – KEN-East, Morocco –MAR-
North, Mali –MLI-RR-LL-West, Mozambique –MOZ-RR-South, ,Mauritius-MUS-East, Malawi -MWI-LL-East, Rwanda –RWA-LL-
East, Senegal –SEN-West, Sierra Leone –SLE-RR-West, Togo –TGO-RR-West ,Tunisia -TUN-North, Tanzania –TZA-RR-East, Uganda 
–UGA-RR-LL-East, ,Zambia-ZMB-RR-East, Zimbabwe–ZWE-LL-South. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
RR- Resource Rich Countries 
LL = Landlocked 
Central/West/North/East/South – Geographic Location 
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          Table 2a: Bivariate correlation between growth and determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Growth Log 
Initial 
GDP 
(1990) 
Log 
Trade 
openness 
to China 
Log 
Trade 
openness 
to USA 
Log 
Trade 
opennes
s to EU 
Log of 
Trade 
openness 
ROW 
Private 
sector 
Inv. 
Share 
Pop. 
Growth 
Rate 
FDI to 
GDP 
ratio 
Economic 
Growth 
1         
Log Initial 
GDP(1990) 
-0.1691 1        
Log Trade 
openness to 
China 
0.2578 0.0036 1       
Log Trade 
openness to 
USA 
0.2046 -0.0936 0.5763 1      
Log Trade 
Openness to 
EU 
-0.0048 0.2931 0.2522 0.3105 1     
Log Trade 
Openness 
ROW 
0.0225 0.2592 0.2209 -0.1134 0.2029 1    
Private 
Investment 
Share   
0.3602 0.2754 0.3522 0.3253 0.2557 0.1722 1   
Pop. Gro. 
Rate 
0.1642 -0.2866 0.0586 0.0192 -0.1705 -0.0511 0.0836 1  
FDI to GDP 
ratio 
0.4349 -0.2130 0.2707 0.3029 0.2365 0.0988 0.2816 0.1175 1 
AID to GDP 
ratio 
-0.1765 -0.4718 -0.1020 0.0156 -0.2270 -0.2105 -0.5126 -0.0590 -0.0538 
,

 
 
 
 
Table 2b: Bivariate correlation between growth and determinants (continued)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Aid to 
GDP 
Ratio 
Oilprod Conflict Polity2 Inflation East 
Africa 
West 
Africa 
Middle 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
Economic 
Growth 
-0.1765 0.1853 -0.0660 -0.0170 0.0680 -0.0939 -0.0829 0.1490 0.0135 
Log Initial 
GDP(1990) 
-0.4718 0.0333 -0.2519 0.0631 -0.1216 -0.0846 -0.2258 0.0175 0.2975 
Log Trade 
openness to 
China 
-0.1020 0.2152 -0.1662 -0.0023 0.0690 -0.2828 0.1249 0.1523 0.0062 
Log Trade 
openness to 
USA 
0.0156 0.4531 0.0121 -0.0486 0.3013 -0.4605 0.1555 0.2723 -0.0214 
Log Trade 
Openness to 
EU 
-0.2270 0.2505 -0.2270 -0.1598 -0.0379 -0.4199 0.1883 0.1471 0.2694 
Log ot Trade 
Openness to 
ROW 
-0.2105 0.0752 -0.1286 -0.0540 -0.0337 0.1430 0.0143 -0.0075 0.1226 
Private Sector 
Investment 
Share 
-0.5126 0.3701 -0.1123 -0.1015 0.1888 -0.2542 -0.2059 0.4412 0.0461 
Pop. Gro. Rate -0.0590 0.2118 -0.0265 0.0835 -0.0284 -0.0861 0.0928 0.1498 -0.1956 
FDI to GDP 
ratio 
-0.0538 0.2316 0.0228 -0.1289 0.1783 -0.1419 -0.1035 0.3256 -0.0225 
AID to GDP 
ratio 
1 -0.2775 0.1963 0.0278 0.1817 0.2324 0.0251 -0.1942 -0.1946 
Oilprod  1 0.0007 -0.1363 0.1239 -0.5075 0.1737 0.4769 -0.0922 
Conflict   1 -0.1524 0.1433 0.0983 -0.0826 0.2042 -0.1343 
Polity2    1 -0.0556 0.0950 0.1040 -0.2606 -0.3006 
Inflation     1 0.1195 -0.1466 0.2066 -0.2527 
East Africa      1 -0.4506 -0.3142 -0.2265 
West Africa       1 -0.3347 -0.2412 
Middle Africa        1 -0.1682 
North Africa         1 
;

The polity2 measure provided by the Polity IV project of the Integrated Network for Social 
Conflict Research (INSCR) was also used as a regressor. Our regressions also control for inflation 
by including the absolute deviation of inflation from 3 in logs (see Chang et al. 2009). Before 
carrying out our computations we calculate non-overlapping 2-year averages for data values for 
each country on the dataset which spans 1990-2009. The reason for this transformation is that 
averaging the dataset helps to capture steady state relationships between the variables on the one 
hand while simultaneously removing, to a certain degree, measurement error and business cycle 
effects14. In addition, regional and year dummy variables are included within our regression 
specification in order to control for both regional and temporal effects within the sample. Table 1 
contains information on all variable definitions, data sources, units of measurements, descriptive 
statistics and country lists used within this study. All variables excluding “oilprod”, the binary 
indicator capturing whether a particular country is an oil producer or not, and initial GDP (the 
level of GDP in 1990 for each African country) show within panel variation and all variables show 
reasonable means and variances.  
In addition, Tables 2a and 2b provide the correlation coefficients for all variable pairs within the 
dataset. A preliminary analysis of the pairwise correlations suggests that they are, in general, 
acceptable and generally intuitive. These results, though preliminary, do not highlight any 
difficulties with our method of estimation. Among the bilateral trade openness variables we 
observe a 0.57 correlation between trade with China and trade with US and could be reflective of 
close interrelationships between trading relationships between both regional partners. The 
correlation may well reflect the interconnected nature of these economies through the existence of 
global value chains since China’s exports comprise value added from the rest of the world, 
especially other Asian nations and the US. In fact according to the OECD(2015) and Antràs 
 
7
/				
,
	#		9## .3*	

*	*		
	F
###.
	3*
	,
	#			8	
:

*
	*

1
		
,		
- ;#*

  ### 
<

(2016), changes in the structure and pattern of trade have occurred over the last two decades such 
that three quarters of international trade comprised firms buying and selling inputs and investment 
goods and services that contribute to the production process and not directly trading in final 
products per se. The trends in and prevalence of these global value chains implies that the origin 
of trade may well, in fact, be less relevant as firms strategically decide on where to locate specific 
production tasks.  
 
6. Results 
Table 3 below contains ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates for equation 1. The 
results of a variety of specifications of the model are displayed in columns (i) to (v) of the table. 
Column (i) of the table presents estimates of the baseline regression - a simple linear regression 
model without year and country fixed effects. Columns (ii) and (iii) of Table 3 depict coefficient 
estimates incorporating: year effects and country fixed effects, respectively. In column (iv), 
coefficient estimates for the model estimated with both year and country specific fixed effects 
modelled explicitly using indicator variables are displayed. Finally, column (v) of Table 3 presents 
coefficient estimates of the fixed effects filtered (FEF) estimator of Pesaran and Zhou (2014) 
providing consistent estimates of time invariant regressors.  
In general, the coefficient estimates on the log of initial GDP are negative across all columns of 
the table, implying that countries with lower real GDP per capita in 1990 grew relatively faster 
between 1990 and 2009. The coefficient is significant in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3. Within 
the set of variables measuring bilateral trade openness, the results in Table 3 reveal that only 
bilateral trade openness variables with China and the EU produce statistically significant 
coefficients across multiple specifications. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
bilateral trade openness to China holds in columns (iii), (iv) and (v) of the table; thus proving 
fairly robust. The coefficient on bilateral trade openness with the EU however has the opposite 
&

sign across all specifications and is robustly statistically significant. Africa-US trade appears, from 
our results, to have no statistically significant effect on real output growth. These findings 
suggests heterogeneity in the proximate effect of bilateral trade openness of on GDP per capita  
 
  Table 3: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Estimates: Static Model 
Dependent Variable: Logged Difference of  Real GDP per Capita 
Estimation 
Methods 
OLS(robust) 
 
 
 
(i) 
OLS (robust) 
with year 
indicator 
variables only 
(ii) 
OLS(robust 
with country 
indicator 
variables only) 
(iii) 
OLS (robust) with 
both 
year and country  
indicator variables 
(iv) 
 
Fixed Effect-
Filtered 
(Pesaran and 
Zhou, 2014 
(v) 
 
Control 
Variables 
     
Log Initial 
GDP(1990) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0392*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0196 
(0.0462) 
-0.0122 
(0.0506) 
-0.0137 
(0.0317) 
Log Trade 
openness to 
China 
0.0088 
(0.0055) 
0.0113 
(0.0069) 
0.0162* 
(0.0082) 
0.0377*** 
(0.0131) 
0.0377*** 
(0.119) 
Log Trade 
openness to 
USA 
-0.0003 
(0.0054) 
-0.0024 
(0.006) 
0.0001 
(0.0107) 
-0.0084 
(0.0115) 
-0.0084 
(0.0103) 
Log Trade 
Openness to 
EU 
-0.0398*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0416*** 
(0.0108) 
-0.0564 
(0.0306) 
-0.0757** 
(0.036) 
-0.0757** 
(0.0324) 
Log of Trade 
Openness to 
ROW 
-0.0051 
(0.0066) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.0038 
(0.0149) 
-0.007 
(0.0158) 
-0.0068 
(0.0140) 
Private Sector 
Investment 
0.2406*** 
(0.0567) 
0.2299*** 
(0.0503) 
0.2531 
(0.1084) 
0.2581** 
(0.1061) 
0.2581*** 
(0.0956) 
Log of Pop. 
Growth 
-0.0016 
(0.0133) 
-0.0014 
(0.0126) 
0.0125 
(0.0189) 
0.01181 
(0.01738) 
0.0118 
(0.0157) 
FDI to GDP 
ratio 
0.6796** 
(0.2697) 
0.6933*** 
(0.6933) 
0.6005* 
(0.3607) 
0.6279** 
(0.28) 
0.6279** 
(0.2523) 
AID to GDP 
ratio 
-0.1909 
(0.1184) 
-0.222* 
(0.1226) 
-0.1731 
(0.2129) 
-0.215 
(0.246) 
-0.2150 
(-0.0074) 
Oilprod 0.0045 
(0.0213) 
0.0057 
(0.0222) 
 
-0.1326* 
(0.0764) 
-0.1205 
(0.0833) 
-0.0074 
(0.0281) 
Conflict  -0.0291* 
(0.0164) 
-0.02871* 
(0.0166) 
-0.0008 
(0.0289) 
-0.0074 
(0.031) 
0.0031 
(0.0055) 
Polity2 0.0009 
(0.0019) 
0.0011 
(0.0019) 
0.0008 
(0.006) 
0.0031 
(0.0061) 
-0.0030 
(0.0068) 
Inflation -0.0053 
(0.0061) 
-0.0045 
(0.0062) 
-0.0026 
(0.0077) 
-0.003 
(0.0076) 
-0.0030 
(0.0068) 
Constant 0.2531*** 
(0.0872) 
0.2245 
(0.08) 
0.1431 
(0.068) 
0.0182 
(0.0182) 
- 
 0.3281 0.364 0.3973  - 
 Observations 333 333 333 333 333 
       Notes: *** means significant at the 1% level 
                    ** means significant at the 5% level 
                   * means significant at the  10% level       
 

 
 
growth by trading partner, corroborating earlier findings by Busse et al. (2016). This result reflects 
the fact that, through the channel of expanding bilateral trade, China’s rapid rise over the review 
period has positively impacted Africa’s growth performance over the period. It is interesting to 
note from Table 3 however, that although bilateral trade was significant in affecting growth 
outcomes that across all columns of Table 3, the largest marginal contributor to real economic 
growth in Africa, over the sample period was the foreign direct investment ratio. The positive 
coefficient on the FDI to GDP variable implies that between 1990 – 2009, African countries which 
experienced greater FDI flows experienced significantly higher real GDP growth. In addition to 
the coefficient on the variable being of a higher order of magnitude than other regressors, the 
variable is also highly statistically significant. On the basis of these preliminary results, it would 
appear that FDI to Africa has produced a relatively greater effect on economic growth across 
Africa than regional trade openness. 
Perusing the coefficient estimates in Table 3 reveals that private sector investment to GDP ratio is 
also a key factor positively and significantly affecting real GDP growth on the continent over the 
sample period. The coefficient on private sector investment is highly statistically significant across  
most specifications. On the other hand, increases in the AID to GDP ratio appear to have a 
statistically significant, negative impact on per capita economic growth supporting previous 
economic research reporting a negative effect of aid on real GDP per capita growth (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011; Easterly and Williamson, 2011). The ineffectiveness of the policies of aid 
granting institutions, institutional weaknesses on the part of recipient countries and adverse real 
exchange rate effects of aid flows are all possible explanations for this phenomenon provided 
within the literature. It is also noteworthy that some specifications of the model in Table 3, appear 
#
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to provide some evidence to support the intuition that conflict is bad for growth; confirming a 
priori expectations. 
   .         Table 4:  Two Stage Least Squares and GMM Estimates: Dynamic Model 
Estimation Method Two Stage 
Least Square 
Estimator 
(Using 
symmetric 
Trade 
openness 
variables as 
excluded 
instruments 
(i) 
Two Stage 
Least Square 
Estimator 
(Using 
differenced 
Trade 
openness 
variables as 
excluded 
instruments 
(ii) 
SYS-GMM 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
 
 
(one step) 
 
 
 
(iii) 
SYS- GMM 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
 
 
(two step) 
 
 
 
(iv) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
- - 0.9307*** 
(0.1382) 
0.9887*** 
(0.09075) 
Log Initial GDP(1990) - - 0.2434 
(0.1724) 
0.1149 
(0.1623) 
Log Trade openness to 
China 
0.0384*** 
(0.0121) 
0.0294 
(0.0297) 
0.0587* 
(0.0346) 
0.0465** 
(0.02) 
Log Trade openness to 
USA 
-0.0063 
(0.0151) 
0.0061 
(0.0332) 
0.0285 
(0.0668) 
-0.002 
(0.0416) 
Log Trade Openness to 
EU 
-0.0579 
(0.0406) 
-0.1521** 
(0.0641)-
0.0282 
-0.1982** 
(0.0785) 
-0.1207** 
(0.0541) 
Log of Trade Openness 
to ROW 
0.0018 
(0.0197) 
-0.0282 
(0.0226) 
-0.0322 
(0.0424) 
 
-0.0301 
(0.053) 
Private Sector 
Investment 
0.256*** 
(0.0906) 
0.2472** 
(0.1151) 
0.0618 
(0.3816) 
0.0800 
(0.2587) 
Log of Pop. 
Growth 
0.0132 
(0.0126) 
0.0072 
(0.0136) 
0.02994** 
(0.0142) 
-0.0317 
(0.0347) 
FDI to GDP ratio 0.6082*** 
(0.1376) 
0.6881*** 
(0.1542) 
2.292*** 
(0.7369) 
1.8212*** 
(0.434) 
AID to GDP ratio -0.2343* 
(0.1421) 
-0.1762 
(0.1496) 
0.2893 
(0.3264) 
0.2884 
(0.1952) 
Conflict  -0.0071 
(0.0281) 
-0.0101 
(0.02905) 
0.0119 
(0.0318) 
0.0024 
(0.0327) 
Polity2 0.0031 
(0.0031) 
0.0033 
(0.0032) 
-0.0013 
(0.0061) 
-0.0013 
(0.006) 
inflation -0.0036 
(0.0083 
-0.0013 
(0.0086) 
-0.0224** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0193* 
(0.0103) 
Constant -0.0257 -0.2429 
(0.2354) 
-1.281* 
(0.718) 
-0.866 
(0.83) 
() 0.2586 0.2335 - - 
Chi-squared - -   
 Observations 333 333 333 333 
AR(1) Arellano Bond test: 
P value: 
- - 0.047 0.027 
AR(2) Arellano Bond test: 
P Value: 
- - 0.221 0.159 
Hansen Test - - 0.128 0.131 
No of Instruments 20 20 26 26 
               *For one step GMM the robust estimator of the parameter estimates are calculated and reported 
               * For two step GMM the robust standard errors are computed having applied Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. 
                *Year dummies are included in all specifications  
 
                 Notes: *** means significant at the 1% level 
                            ** means significant at the 5% level 
                             * means significant at the 10% level 

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Recall that across all specifications presented in Table 3 it is assumed that the regressors are 
strictly exogenous. However, as discussed earlier, this is not always guaranteed to be the case, and 
there may in fact be endogeneity within the model in which case an estimation framework is 
needed which can provide consistent estimates of the coefficients under such circumstances. In 
light of the possible existence of endogeneity, Table 4, presents both two-stage least square and 
two-step system GMM estimates of the coefficients. In particular, the two stage least squares 
estimator (utilizing external instruments) and system GMM estimators (utilizing internal 
instruments) are employed and are presented in columns (i) to (iv) of the table. Columns (i) and 
(ii) of Table 4 depict the coefficient estimates from the two-stage least squares estimation.  
In column (i), the variables capturing bilateral trade are instrumented by trade openness to each 
country within the dataset measured from the perspective of the regional trading partner. More 
concretely, the instruments of bilateral openness in this specification are derived by dividing the 
sum total of the value of trade flows by the major partner’s (US, China, EU) GDP for each country 
year. Reiterating briefly, the rationale for this specification is that we expect this variable to be 
correlated to bilateral trade openness; however there is no clear and established, direct theoretical 
or empirical link between, regional partners’ trade-openness and GDP growth in a 
particularcountry. This is especially the case for regions such as the EU, US and China since, in 
each case, bilateral trade with each African country represents but a small proportion of the total 
trade for these large economies. Coefficient estimates depicted in Column (ii) result from a two-
stage least squares estimation procedure using alternative instruments. In particular, the 
specification employs differenced values of bilateral trade openness as an instrument for the 
respective bilateral trade variables.  
Both instruments are highly relevant as evidenced from first stage regression formulations of the 
exactly identified models. Remarkably, the coefficient estimates in columns (i) and (ii) reveal a 
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general agreement in the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients across both specifications. More 
specifically, both formulations produce highly similar, statistical significant and positive 
coefficient estimates for private sector investment and FDI to GDP confirming earlier results from 
the fixed effect panel estimates in Table 3. Bilateral trade openness to China is positive and highly 
significant in the model presented in column (i) of Table 4 whereas the negative and statistically 
highly significant coefficient can be observed on the bilateral trade openness variable for Europe 
in column (ii).  
As a final robustness check, we explore the relationship between bilateral trade openness and real 
per capita GDP growth using the system GMM method. This method also controls for 
endogeneity and feedback effects between bilateral trade openness and real GDP growth per 
capita. One key feature of this method is that it allows for instruments to be selected from within 
the model. In addition, the validity of the moment conditions can be inferred using statistical tests 
due toSargan (1958) and Hansen (1982). The latter option is not feasible in the two-stage least 
squares framework given that, in this case, the two stage least squares formulations are exactly 
identified. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 4 depict coefficient estimates for one and two stage 
system GMM models respectively. In these models the both the bilateral trade openness and AID 
to GDP ratio are treated as endogenous variables while the lagged dependent variable is treated as 
predetermined. Note that an extra observation for each country is lost due to the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable. 
 
Both system GMM estimations confirm the positive effect on Africa’s bilateral trade with China 
on GDP growth per capita. The signs and significance of the coefficient estimates on the bilateral 
trade openness variables concur with the earlier specifications. The model also confirms that FDI 
flows into Africa was the major contributing factor to the growth episode observed over the 
review period. The GMM estimates show - consistent with growth theory and the earlier 
specifications – that private sector investment share had a positive and significant effect on 
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economic growth. On the other hand bilateral trade with the EU had a statistically significant, 
negative effect on real per capita GDP growth. In general therefore the findings appear robust 
across both static and dynamic formulations of the model. 
Evidence across various specifications in our analysis suggests that over the 1990-2009 sample 
period examined, the turnaround observed in the growth fortunes of African economies can be 
traced to a combination of factors namely: an increase in FDI, private investment and openness to 
trade. It is also important to note that while the estimation results reveal that FDI and private 
investment played the most significant role in Africa’s growth turnaround bilateral trade also 
played, albeit a smaller, but also significant contributory role. In particular, the results reflect the 
fact that significant increase in bilateral trade with China coinciding with China’s economic 
expansion over the period, had positive real growth effects on Africa. 
The negative coefficient on bilateral trade openness with the EU which emerges across fixed 
effects, and both static and dynamic instrumental variables specifications is possibly supportive of 
prior research that point to the inability of African nations to fully take advantage of special trade 
relations due to productive capacity mismatch supply constraints and weak administrative 
structures. Kohnert (2008) remarks that certain EU trade preferences with restrictive rules of 
origin have not delivered the intended tangible impacts on growth, especially where such domestic 
bottlenecks prevail. Moreover, despite decades of preferential treatment granted by the EU, 
African exports are locked in oil and minerals, suggesting a lack of diversification which in turn 
hampers growth. Xenellis (2009), for example, reports that in 2008, 62% of Africa’s total export 
value to the EU was in ‘Mineral fuels’ whereas ‘Manufactured goods’ and ‘Food and live animals’ 
exports amounted to only 9% and 8% respectively.  
However it is also important to re-emphasize that the measure of bilateral trade openness 
employed within this paper – derived by normalizing trade values by GDP- are not a precise 
measure of trade policy per se, but instead represent an outcome variable representing an amalgam 
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of microeconomic, macroeconomic and policy factors influencing trade flows. In light of this, 
appropriate caveats apply. 
7. Robustness Checks 
Additional estimation results from robustness checks performed on the data using the empirical 
model are presented in Tables 5a and 5b below. Table 5a presents panel fixed effect regression 
results performed on sub - samples of interest which test the robustness and validity of earlier 
findings. Table 5b presents two-step System GMM results using the key sub-samples. For 
example, Column (i) of Table 5a depicts results of the model estimated on a subsample of 
resource-rich countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines a country to be ‘resource- 
rich’, when exports of non-renewable natural resources such as oil, minerals and metals account 
for more than 25% of the value of the country’s total exports (Lundgren et al., 2013).  
   
The list of resource-rich countries within the dataset is annotated in Table 1 and coincides closely 
with the list provided by Lundgren et al. (2013) for Africa. Column (i) of Table 5a reveals a 
negative coefficient on the initial GDP per capita variable from which it can be inferred that 
countries resource rich countries with relatively higher initial GDP in 1990 tended to grown 
relatively more slowly than  resource-rich countries which, in 1990, had low GDP per capita at 
that time. Interestingly, bilateral trade with China appears to have positively impacted real 
economic growth per capita for resource rich countries confirming earlier results from both static 
and dynamic estimations on the full sample.  
Another observation from this column is the negative sign on the coefficient on the bilateral trade 
with EU variable. Again, this result corroborates earlier findings from the estimations carried out 
on the full sample displayed in Tables 3 and 4 above. Also consistent with earlier results, we find 
that the coefficient on FDI has a positive sign and is highly statistically significant. This result, 
once aagain, underlines the important role played by FDI on economic growth, not only when the  
,
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Table 5a: Robustness Checks: Fixed Effects 
Estimation Method Fixed 
Effects 
 
 
Res.- Rich 
(i) 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Non –Res. 
Rich 
(ii) 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Landlocked 
 
(iii) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Not 
Landlocked 
 
(iv) 
Fixed Effects 
 
Sub- Saharan 
 
 
(v) 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Non–Oil 
Prod. 
    (vi) 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Oil Prod. 
 
(vii) 
 
Log Initial 
GDP(1990) 
-0.1321** 
(0.061) 
0.0046 
(0.042) 
-0.0862** 
(0.0413) 
0.0322 
(0.0726) 
-0.0753 
(0.0633) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.1748** 
(0.0721) 
Log Trade openness 
to China 
0.0534** 
(0.0216) 
0.0169 
(0.0103) 
0.0317** 
(0.0140) 
0.0542*** 
(0.0187) 
0.0367*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0246** 
(0.0116) 
0.0679** 
(0.0258) 
Log Trade openness 
to USA 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
0.0025 
(0.0121) 
-0.0014 
(0.0165) 
0.0025 
(0.0222) 
-0.0117 
(0.0142) 
-0.0005 
(0.0129) 
-0.0036 
(0.0303) 
Log Trade Openness 
to EU 
-0.0133*** 
(0.045) 
-0.0337 
(0.0293) 
-0.0015 
(0.3911) 
-0.1176*** 
(0.0379) 
-0.0789*** 
(0.02842) 
-0.0319 
(0.025) 
-0.1529** 
(0.0704) 
Log of Trade 
Openness to ROW 
-0.0243 
(0.02) 
0.0591** 
(0.0293) 
0.03912 
(0.0414) 
-0.0186 
(0.0173) 
-0.0084 
(0.0126) 
0.01467 
(0.0142) 
-0.0086 
(0.0352) 
Private Sector 
Investment 
0.1978 
(0.161) 
0.3787*** 
(0.1107) 
0.3366** 
(0.1368) 
0.1809 
(0.1163) 
0.2842*** 
(0.092) 
0.3269*** 
(0.105) 
0.1996 
(0.1808) 
Log of Pop. 
Growth 
-0.0246 
(0.022) 
0.0258** 
(0.0118) 
0.0102 
(0.0160) 
-0.0065 
(0.0188) 
00082 
(0.1259) 
0.0154* 
(0.009) 
0.1142 
(0.1537) 
FDI to GDP ratio 0.612*** 
(0.1703) 
0.207 
(0.3648) 
0.3549 
(0.2982) 
0.6551*** 
(0.1543) 
0.6325*** 
(0.1352) 
0.3476 
(0.3787) 
0.5736*** 
(0.1843) 
AID to GDP ratio 0.2096 
(0.2852) 
-0.5456*** 
(0.1171) 
-1.095*** 
(0.2428) 
0.0751 
(0.0751) 
-0.1608 
(0.1424) 
-0.6182*** 
(0.129) 
0.3076 
(0.3229) 
inflation -0.0116 
(0.0128) 
0.0061 
(0.0083) 
0.1316 
(0.0104) 
-0.0063 
(0.0113) 
-0.004 
(0.0085) 
-0.0003 
(0.0081) 
-0.0038 
(0.01571) 
Conflict  -0.0182 
(0.0406) 
-0.0146 
(0.0336) 
-0.0218 
(0.0402) 
-0.0122 
(0.0378) 
-0.00617 
(0.0286) 
-0.0296 
(0.0265) 
0.01385 
(0.06) 
Polity2 0.0082 
(0.0049) 
0.0003 
(0.0032) 
-0.0044 
(0.0048) 
0.0046 
(0.0041) 
0.0029 
(0.0032) 
-0.0032 
(0.003) 
0.0146** 
(0.0064) 
Constant 0.8083 
(0.4503) 
0.122 
(0.2776) 
0.8972 
(0.385) 
-0.4103 
(0.5283) 
0.351 
(0.4667) 
1.024*** 
(0.2742) 
0.9831* 
(0.531) 
() 0.5049 0.5402 0.5739 0.4843 0.4563 0.46 0.5473 
 Observations 180 153 99 234 306 207 126 
 Notes: *** means significant at the 1% level 
              ** means significant at the 5% level 
              * means significant at the  10% level     
 
full sample is considered, but also when the model is estimated on the sub-sample of resource-rich 
countries in Africa over the period 1990 – 2009. 
The coefficient results and statistical significance of the coefficients in column (ii) imply a 
contrast in the economic characteristics and outcomes of resource rich and non-resource rich 
African countries. For the latter group, initial GDP per capita and bilateral trade with the EU, USA 
and China appear to have been less importance in influencing real growth per capita outcomes. By 
way of contrast, FDI appears to have been the major positive contributor to economic growth for 
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this country group while the coefficient on the variable capturing bilateral trade with the rest of the 
world is positive and statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient on foreign aid is 
negative and statistically significant implying that AID in resource-poor countries may not be 
growth inducing. The differences in the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates when the 
empirical model is applied to the subsamples of resource-rich and non-resource-rich African 
countries highlights the heterogeneity in economic endowments, interactions and outcomes within 
the sample of African countries.  
Fixed effect results of coefficient estimates for the sub-sample of landlocked African countries and 
those countries which are not landlocked are presented in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 5a. The 
result shows that across both subsamples the increase in bilateral trade with China, as measured by 
trade openness had a positive and statistically significant effect on growth in real GDP per capita 
over the period. Despite similarities in this regard, the results again reveal differences across 
country groups, with FDI to GDP ratio representing a positive factor affecting economic growth 
for countries not within the landlocked category. Moreover, the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the variable capturing bilateral trade with the EU is also evident for non-
landlocked countries. The coefficient expressing the relationship between foreign aid receipts and 
real economic growth per capita is also negative and significant for non- landlocked countries with 
the negative sign on the initial GDP per capita variable for this country subsample implying a 
general pattern of convergence of the years 1990 to 2009. Results for landlocked countries in 
Table 5a show that initial GDP growth was negatively related to economic growth over the period 
and savings was a positive contributor to real GDP growth per capita within the subsample. 
Column (v) of Table 5a reveals coefficient estimates for countries classified as Sub-Saharan 
African countries. It should be noted that the estimation sample used for this paper contains only 
three North African countries – namely: Mauritania, Egypt and Tunisia. The historic, cultural, 
economic and demographic distinctions between North African and Sub-Saharan African 
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countries are well known. The estimated coefficient signs and levels of significance for the Sub-
Saharan subsample prove to be relatively robust in light of findings on the wider sample. The 
estimated coefficients on bilateral trade openness with China, private savings as a percentage of 
GDP along with the FDI to GDP ratio all suggest that these variables are positive and statistically 
significant factors affecting growth. On the other hand bilateral trade with the European Union 
appears to have the opposite effect on real GDP growth. 
The final two columns of Table 5a show estimation results on subsamples for oil producing and 
non-oil producing African countries. The results reveal that, for both groups, initial GDP per 
capita is statistically significant and positively related to real GDP per capita growth rates; 
implying divergence in growth outcomes within each groups over the sample period. Secondly we 
observe a statistically significant effect of bilateral trade with China on real economic growth 
across both sub-samples. Notably the coefficient is higher in the case of oil-producing countries 
indicating a relatively larger positive effect in the oil-rich countries. This mirrors earlier findings 
for the resource-rich subsample of countries, in that, the coefficient on the bilateral trade openness 
with China variable was also relatively higher to the base category for this subgroup. These 
findings imply that bilateral trade with China has tended to benefit oil exporters and resource-rich 
countries in terms of real growth in GDP per capita. Interestingly, a statistically significant, 
negative coefficient is returned on bilateral trade with EU variable for oil-producing countries 
mirroring the effects found in the sub-sample of resource rich countries. The importance of FDI to 
GDP ratio and private savings ratio to real per capita economic growth is underlined by positive 
and statistically significant coefficients in both the oil-producing and non-oil-producing sample of 
countries.  
Oil-producing countries which have strong political institutions have grown faster on average over 
the sample period. On the other hand, countries not producing oil which are recipients of  
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         Table 5b: Robustness Checks: Two-Step System GMM 
Estimation Method System 
GMM 
(i) 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
Res.- Rich 
 
 
(i) 
System 
GMM 
(ii) 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
(Two-
Step) 
 
Non –Res. 
Rich 
(ii) 
 
System 
GMM 
(iii) 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
Landlocked 
 
 
(iii) 
System 
GMM 
(v) 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
Non-
Northern 
 
(iv) 
 
System  
GMM 
(vi) 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
Non -Oil 
Prod. 
        (v) 
 
System  
GMM 
(vii) 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
Oil Prod. 
 
(vi) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
0.8809*** 
(0.3733) 
0.9029*** 
(0.201) 
0.9510*** 
(0.0622) 
0.919*** 
(0.0683) 
0.9123*** 
(0.239) 
0.7428*** 
(0.0947) 
Log Initial 
GDP(1990) 
0.131 
(0.1701) 
0.1376 
(0.2157) 
-0.045 
(0.0571) 
0.054 
(0.0673) 
0.0345 
(0.1244) 
0.1946 
0.1369) 
Log Trade 
openness to China 
-0.0025 
(0.0578) 
0.0029 
(0.0253) 
-0.001 
(0.0137) 
0.0287 
(0.0231) 
0.0385** 
(0.0176) 
0.2232 
(0.377) 
Log Trade 
openness to USA 
0.022 
(0.1246) 
0.0619** 
(0.0237) 
-0.041 
(0.0363) 
-0.0374 
(0.028) 
0.1041 
(0.1145) 
-0.1446 
(0.168) 
Log Trade 
Openness to EU 
-0.1464 
(0.1953) 
0.0003 
(0.1266) 
0.0314 
(0.0824) 
-0.0719 
(0.0872) 
0.1429 
(0.2446) 
0.1929 
(0.3017) 
Log of Trade 
Openness to 
ROW 
-0.092 
(0.0783) 
0.0202 
(0.0746) 
0.0045 
(0.009) 
-0.0351 
(0.0302) 
0.0033 
(0.0708) 
-0.792 
(1.328) 
Private Sector 
Investment 
0.8656** 
(0.4565) 
-0.0251 
(0.1589) 
0.5446*** 
(0.1883) 
0.4896** 
(0.21) 
0.2811 
(0.6041) 
1.227** 
(0.519) 
Log of Pop. 
Growth 
-0.0386 
(0.0358) 
0.0797** 
(0.0394) 
-0.0256 
(0.019) 
0.0006 
(0.0351) 
0.0525*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.4453 
(0.6753) 
FDI to GDP ratio 1.082** 
(0.4627) 
-0.2037 
(0.797) 
0.6416** 
(0.246) 
1.0213*** 
(0.2025) 
1.6019 
(2.669) 
1.0974*** 
(0.3191) 
AID to GDP ratio 0.4499 
(0.9886) 
-0.0437 
(0.1521) 
-0.1065 
(0.299) 
0.1608 
(0.3391) 
-0.4049 
(0.9378) 
1.102 
(1.729) 
inflation -0.1203 
(0.0195) 
0.0143 
(0.0236) 
-0.0077 
(0.0091) 
-0.0077 
(0.0066) 
0.0102 
(0.0122) 
-0.0186 
(0.0297) 
Conflict  -0.0027 
(0.0994) 
-0.0187 
(0.1324) 
-0.0315 
(0.0228) 
-0.0178 
(0.0244) 
0.0621 
(0.1156) 
-0.099 
(0.0891) 
Polity2 0.0019 
(0.0127) 
-0.0051 
(0.0068) 
0.0057 
(0.0046) 
0.00002 
(0.0033) 
0.00003 
(0.0037) 
-0.0016 
(0.0102) 
Constant -0.5981 
(2.1351) 
- 0.587 
(0.4632) 
-0.068 
(0.382) 
1.285 
(2.252) 
- 
Chi-squared       10.27 5.65 14.05 9.95 3.96 2.05 
 Observations 180 153 234 238 207 126 
AR(1) Arellano 
Bond test: P value: 
0.162 0.059 0.081 0.040 0.108 0.494 
AR(2) Arellano 
Bond test: 
P Value: 
0.315 0.814 0.332 0.238 0.919 0.496 
Hansen Test 0.114 0.227 0.230       0.354 0.27 0.152 
No of Instruments 20 17 25 33 17 14 
Countries 20 17 26 34 23 14 
       *For one step GMM the robust estimator of the the parameter estimates are calculated and reported 
        * For two step GMM the robust standard errors are computed having applied Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. 
        *Year dummies are included in all specifications  
 
          Notes: *** means significant at the 1% level 
                       ** means significant at the 5% level 
                       * means significant at the 10% level 
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significant aid tend to experience relatively inferior economic outcomes than other countries 
within that sub-sample. 
Table 5b depicts two-step System GMM coefficient estimates of the model on the respective sub-
samples when endogeneity of the trade variables are taken into account. It is noteworthy that 
across alternative similar results were obtained. The columns of the Table 5b correspond directly 
to the subsamples. The lagged dependent variable is significant across all specifications which 
suggests the autoregressive nature of growth outcomes in all subsamples over the sample period. 
The second observation from Table 5b, is that both private savings and FDI as a percentage of 
GDP are the two most important variables driving real per capita growth across all specifications. 
These variables are correctly signed across all specifications and in most cases statistically 
significant across the subsamples considered; corroborating earlier findings. Bilateral trade 
openness variable however is only statistically significant at the 5% level in the non-oil producing 
countries subsample. This result indicates that in smaller subsamples, when endogeneity is taken 
into account the effect of bilateral trade – though evident is less robust than within the full sample. 
Population growth has also has a positive and statistically significant effect across countries which 
are not resource rich and are not oil producers. 
Table 5c depicts fixed effect and two- step System GMM results for the model estimated for the 
subsamples of the data before 2001 and post 2001. The sub-samples were chosen to take into 
account into account the date of China’s accession to the WTO; the 11th of December 2001. 
Although coefficient signs are fairly robust across all estimations, the statistical significance of the 
coefficient estimates differs across both subsamples. For example, before China’s accession to the 
WTO, both fixed effect and dynamic GMM estimates suggest that private sector investment 
played a major role in real per capita growth in Africa. On the other hand, negative and  
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                             Table 5c: Robustness Checks: Two-Step System GMM 
Estimation Method Fixed 
Effects 
 
 
Before 
WTO 
Accession 
 
(i) 
 
 
 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
 
After 
WTO 
Accession 
 
(ii) 
 
 
System  
GMM 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
Before WTO 
Accession 
 
(iii) 
 
System  
GMM 
Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
 
(Two-Step) 
 
After WTO 
Accession 
 
(iv) 
 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
- - 0.6443** 
(0.246) 
0.7035*** 
(0.1863) 
Log Initial 
GDP(1990) 
-0.3623*** 
(0.0823) 
-0.0397 
(0.117) 
0.3269 
(0.2433) 
0.2165 
(0.1841) 
Log Trade openness 
to China 
0.01560 
(0.0169) 
0.0934*** 
(0.0284) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
0.0405 
(0.0528) 
Log Trade openness 
to USA 
0.0242 
(0.0264) 
-0.01728 
(0.0215) 
-0.0082 
(0.0187) 
-0.0405 
(0.0528) 
Log Trade Openness 
to EU 
-0.01047** 
(0.049) 
-0.0224 
(0.0579) 
-0.0175 
(0.0397) 
-0.0402 
(0.0458) 
Log of Trade 
Openness to ROW 
0.0248 
(0.0275) 
-0.006 
(0.0245) 
-0.0213 
(0.063) 
-0.0698 
(0.0817) 
Private Sector 
Investment 
0.5474*** 
(0.15519) 
0.4683** 
(0.196) 
0.685*** 
(0.196) 
0.6288 
(0.5188) 
Log of Pop. 
Growth 
-0.0046 
(0.0156) 
0.0672 
(0.0867) 
-0.0297 
(0.0212) 
-0.081 
(0.1414) 
FDI to GDP ratio 0.2673 
(0.2352) 
0.6384** 
(0.2465) 
1.0546*** 
(0.254) 
1.117** 
(0.4997) 
AID to GDP ratio -0.426** 
(0.1863) 
0.2513 
(0.3687) 
0.1678 
(0.1414) 
-1.5404* 
(0.8673) 
inflation -0.004 
(0.0012) 
0.0059 
(0.0134) 
-0.021* 
(0.0113) 
-0.01404 
(0.0310) 
Conflict  0.0367 
(0.0488) 
-0.0328 
(0.0399) 
-0.07* 
(0.0348) 
0.0377 
(0.639) 
Polity2 0.0002 
(0.0046) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.0003 
(0.0032) 
-0.0005 
(0.0076) 
Constant 2.447 
(0.5872) 
0.1645 
(0.8487) 
      0.1433 
      (0.2646) 
0.186 
(1.5203) 
()     0.5427 0.5688 - - 
Chi-squared - - 1.73 1.82 
 Observations 185 148 185 111 
AR(1) Arellano 
Bond test: P value: 
- - 0.124 0.155 
AR(2) Arellano 
Bond test: 
P Value: 
- - 0.369 0.178 
Hansen Test - - 0.421 0.178 
No of Instruments - - 16 15 
Countries 37 37 37 37 
                                  *For one step GMM the robust estimator of  the parameter estimates are calculated and reported 
                                   * For two step GMM the robust standard errors are computed having applied Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. 
                                   *Year dummies are included in all specifications  
 
                                    Note s:  *** means significant at the 1% level 
                                                  ** means significant at the 5% level 
                                                   * means significant at the 10% level 
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statistically significant coefficients are observed on the the aid to GDP ratio for the “Before” fixed 
effect estimate in column (i) and in the “after” dynamic estimate in column (iv), indicating that the  
finding is not as robust. In a similar vein, column (ii) of Table 5c reveals that Africa’s bilateral 
trade with China has played a positive and statistically significant effect on real GDP per capita 
growth in the fixed-effect specification. A positive and statistically significant coefficient is not 
returned in any other specification, implying that the finding is also not a robust one. 
Overall the two-step system GMM results provide robust support for the positive effect of savings 
and foreign direct investment (as a percentage of GDP) on real growth outcomes. It can also be 
inferred from the dynamic estimates that conflict and inflation impacted real GDP growth per 
capita negatively, especially pre-2001. 
In general, therefore, when both fixed effect and dynamic system GMM estimation are applied  to 
subsamples of the dataset corresponding to the date of China’s accession to the WTO the results 
confirm the key role played by savings and foreign direct investment in Africa’s positive growth 
outcomes over the review period. This finding suggests that it was primarily internal factors, 
rather than the external influence of increased bilateral trade, that was the critical driver of the 
growth realized on the continent. Foreign direct investment also appears to have played a key role. 
Bilateral trade with regional partners does not appear to have played such a significant role. Where 
the estimation results, suggest a statistical significant role via the effects of bilateral regional trade, 
the bilateral partner with whom trade appears to have affected growth is China, but the results are 
not robust across specifications and all sub-samples when subsamples are chosen taking into 
account the date of China’s accession to the WTO. 
8. Discussion 
It is useful to compare our findings with existing studies from the literature examining the impact 
of trade on growth in Africa. A certain degree of caution and scepticism should be exercised in 
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establishing direct comparisons between earlier research papers and the results we present here. In 
particular, differences in i) the sample period analysed, ii) the actual countries included within the 
estimation sample, iv) the variables (or information) included within the empirical model and the 
measurement of such variables, v) the frequency of the variables employed to carry out the 
analysis and vi) the estimation methods and model specification are only a few reasons why direct 
comparison between empirical results cannot be made. 
Of the recent research papers on trade and growth in Africa, the review period analysed and the 
methodological approach of Busse et al. (2016) is similar to the approach of this paper. The 
significance of trade in affecting the growth outcomes of African countries is a finding common to 
both papers. This is especially the case for countries which are natural resource exporters – a 
finding corroborated by the fixed effect estimates produced in Section 5. Busse et al. (2016) that 
the growth effects differ depending in whether import or export flows are considered. Busse et al. 
(2016) conclude that FDI and AID play a less significant role in Africa’s growth than is robustly 
confirmed in this paper. The literature has pointed to, inter alia, institutional weakness on the part 
of recipient countries and sub-optimal donor practices as factors inimical to the effectiveness of 
aid. These authors also find very little evidence in support of the hypothesis that rest of the world 
trade with China has had a positive effect on real economic growth in Africa over the period, 
again consistent with our findings.  
Brückner and Lederman (2012) employ a two-stage least squares strategy using an unbalanced 
panel containing annual data for a similar sample of 40 Sub-Saharan African countries over the 
period 1980-2009 to test the hypothesis that trade causes growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and find 
strong, positive evidence of both long and short run effects. Chang and Mendy (2012) use a panel 
fixed effect estimation strategy on sample of 36 African countries over the period 1980-2009 and 
also conclude that openness and FDI both positively and significantly influence economic growth 
in Africa. This result concurs with our findings. Finding mixed results on signs of aid and 
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investment, however, the authors conclude that these variables positively affect growth 
conditional on whether there are complementary growth-inducing policies in place within the 
specific countries or region of Africa being examined. Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) also investigate 
the hypothesis that “where you export matters” using 1995-2008 data from a smaller subset of 
African countries and suggests an inverted “U-shape” function relating exports to developed 
countries and economic growth in Africa. The study concludes, like this paper, that trade 
diversification across partners may be beneficial for growth. In general therefore, while the finding 
that China’s trade with Africa appears to be a significant driver of economic growth is robust 
across the majority of studies; there appears still to be disagreement regarding the channels 
through which the effects are expressed. The results provided in this paper highlights the fact that 
openness to China had stronger growth effects for resource-rich and oil exporting African 
countries, corroborating an earlier findings by Busse et al. (2016) and Drummond and Liu (2013),. 
The fairly robust empirical finding that EU trade with Africa has negative growth effects must be 
examined within the context the economic literature. Using a structural gravity model Cipollina, 
Debucquet and Salvatici (2017) find a “minor impact of EU preferential trade policies trade 
flows”, although the authors admit that certain complex interactions are not captured by their 
model. Similar results were also found by Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso (2016) Davies and 
Nilsson (2013) who specifically considered the everything-but arms (EBA) agreement and find 
that EBA- eligible countries realize relatively lower exports.  
The growth deterring effect of EU-Africa trade corroborates conclusions from the literature that 
EU preferential schemes were not as successful in fostering trade between EU and Africa. Strict 
rules of origin of EU schemes appear to have a negative effect on both utilisation rates and total 
aggregated trade flows. While the objective PTAs is to facilitate trade, the costs of complying with 
rules of origin often act as a trade barrier and can even outweigh the benefits of the tariff reduction 
(Naumann, 2013). The weight of evidence also suggests the stifling of export diversification by 
77

EU preferential trading arrangements. A highly concentrated export structure can be growth 
reducing as it carries a number of risks namely, high exposure to external economic shocks, 
increased volatility in market prices resulting in export instability and lower investments by risk-
averse firms and inability to forge new linkages in the domestic economy via network effects 
between sectors (Hesse, 200815; EC, 2015;).  
 
Compared to EU’s GSP schemes (including EBA), AGOA has more liberal rules of origins. Most 
studies have found a positive effect of this agreement in enhancing trade between USA and Africa, 
yet our results show that trade with US did not have growth enhancing effects. As suggested by 
Brenton and Hoppe (2006) while US AGOA preferences might have increased trade the more 
significant constraints on trade relate to domestic supply side constraints, poor infrastructure, and 
weak policy environments (see also Frankel 2010, Hoekman and Ozden 2006, and Edwards and 
Lawrence 2010).  Moreover, Ozden and Rienhardt (2004) argue that GSP schemes can discourage 
countries from undertaking domestic liberalisation, and that the uncertainty regarding the duration 
of GSP regimes can discourage investment. They find that countries’ export performance 
improved once they were no longer part of the US’ GSP scheme.  
 
Trading with an economic giant such as China could be detrimental to growth of smaller 
economies in many respects. Many African nations, being heavily dependent on resource exports 
are susceptible to the Dutch disease due to a rise in demand from China, rendering other export 
activities less competitive (Zafar, 2007). With an influx of cheaper Chinese manufactures, many 
African firms could be displaced from the domestic market (Broadman, 2007) as well as third 
markets (Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2009). Our results however point to a pro-growth effect of 
the Sino-African trade, suggesting that these negative effects are countered by other beneficial 
transmission channels identified in the literature. Zafar (2007) notes that China’s demand for 
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natural resources to fuel its growth contributed to an upward swing in prices and gave a boost to 
SSA’s real GDP. He further observes that consumers in Africa could benefit from imports of low-
cost manufactured goods from China, allowing them to increase the variety of consumer goods 
available to them. Additionally, producers can incorporate more affordable capital goods from 
China into their production processes (He, 2013; Anderson et al., 2015). Broadman (2007) links 
the imports of machinery and equipment to the heavy presence of Chinese investment in African 
countries, which not only propelled African trade into cutting edge multinational networks but 
also contributed to a rise in GDP. As noted by Anderson et al. (2015), relocation of Chinese 
exporters to Africa in the context of rising labour costs in China has the potential to significantly 
boost economic activities in Africa and improve linkages with the global economy. The findings 
of the current paper, therefore, appear to be consistent with previous results from the economic 
literature.  
The fairly robust empirical results of this paper appear to support the hypothesis that foreign aid 
can be negative for economic growth, is supported by Young and Sheehan (2014) who provide 
recent evidence using a 166 country dataset that aid can undermine institutions essential for 
economic growth and development. Dreher et al. (2016) also report that aid tied to geopolitical 
rather than purely developmental motives can have insignificant or even negative implications for 
growth. 
9. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the main factors driving the recent growth episode in Africa over the 
period 1990-2009. This study extends the literature in two main ways. Firstly, it clarifies the effect 
of trade outcomes on Africa’s growth by disaggregating the trade openness variable to account 
separately for Africa’s openness with its four main trading partners: China, USA, the EU and the 
rest of the world (ROW). This method allows us to observe and highlight the changing dynamics 
in bilateral trade flow values normalized by GDP between Africa and three major economic 
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players in the world economy. Secondly, while normalized trade flow values are a crude measure 
of trade policy and is inherently a measure of trade outcomes, the measure still allows us to  
identify, the relative strength and importance of bilateral trade outcomes, among other regressors 
identified within the empirical growth literature, in contributing to Africa’s growth turnaround 
over the review period.  
 Notwithstanding the careful modelling of trade openness by disaggregating trade flows to each 
African country by major bilateral trading regions, the empirical results identify private sector 
investment and foreign direct investment as the chief drivers of economic growth in Africa over 
the review period 1990 – 2009; confirming the results of earlier empirical studies (Sala and Trivín, 
2014; Adams, 2009). The finding that private investment and foreign direct investment were the 
primary drivers of real economic growth in Africa over the review period remain robust across a 
variety of fixed effect, dynamic system GMM estimations. Furthermore, this result also robustly 
holds across sub-samples of resource-rich, landlocked, Sub-Saharan and oil-producing countries. 
Relatively weaker, but nonetheless, statistically significant effects related to bilateral trade with 
major trading partners are also evident across some specifications. Among the three major trading 
partners modelled, positive coefficients and statistical significance of the coefficient are most 
often associated with Africa’s bilateral trade with China than is the case for the coefficient on 
bilateral trade variables capturing bilateral trade with America and Europe after controlling for a 
variety of institutional and other economic factors.  
The statistically significant, positive effect of bilateral trade openness with China on real 
economic growth in Africa holds in sub-samples of resource-rich, landlocked and non-landlocked, 
oil and non-oil producing African countries within a fixed effect estimation framework but is not 
as robust in specifications accounting for endogeneity. It is important to note here, however, that 
the trade openness measure employed in this paper is an outcome variable and not a measure of 
trade policy per se, since the sum of imports and exports normalized by GDP captures the effect of 
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policy but also a mix of complex demand and supply side factors affecting trade. In sum, therefore 
the empirical results reflect that China’s rise as an engine of growth for the global economy, 
including its significantly expanded, resource-driven, bilateral trade with Africa has impacted 
economic growth. It is important to emphasize however that, for the most part, the growth story in 
Africa was primarily driven induced by investment supported by a mix of institutional reforms 
that attracted FDI and increased private sector investment. In fact, the combination of foreign and 
domestic investment could have served as a driver for trade as stated by Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003) which raises the question as to whether the growth effects on African economies from 
bilateral trade with China could be a transitional phenomenon resulting for China’s recent 
increased integration within the global economy. One could also argue that with the expansion of 
production networks around the globe, the “country origin” of trade has become more blurred. 
Moreover, China not only hosts a number of multinational firms but is also the ‘final link’ in the 
global production chain, engaging in significant trade in intermediate goods. Africa’s traditional 
trade partners may therefore exert an indirect effect on its growth through China. 
 
Another key dimension highlighted by the empirical analysis is that nature of the Africa’s bilateral 
trade. Recalling that a significant proportion of Africa’s exports to China are of an extractive 
nature, it is perhaps not too surprising that most countries in Africa appear to have benefitted in 
one way or another from high commodity demand from the rising giant, a wider variety of cheap 
consumer goods sourced from China and more affordable capital goods that could be embedded in 
their domestic production processes. Higher imports of capital goods are also closely linked to 
considerable investments by Chinese multinationals in a number of African countries. Will 
Africa’s bilateral trade with China produce sustainable and long run growth on the continent? This 
is a salient question which is not directly addressed within this paper. Bresnahan et al. (2016) 
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however use firm level data for Africa to suggest that the effect of trade on productivity growth 
and thereby long run growth in Africa may well differ by sector and by country. 
The negative marginal effect of bilateral trade openness to the EU on real per capita GDP growth 
in Africa is somewhat puzzling, against the background of the system of preferential access 
granted the African economies over the review period. The result appears to slightly contradict 
earlier findings by Cicera et al. (2016), European Commission (2015) and Manchin (2006) which 
indicate that EU trade preferences have led to induced increased developing country exports to the 
EU and that even when ACP trade shares to the EU fall, the decline would have been even bigger 
in the absence of trade preferences. On the other hand, none of these studies consider a full sample 
of African countries only. Moreover, studies by Cipollina, Debucquet and Salvatici (2017) 
Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso (2016) and Davies and Nilsson (2013) provide results which seem 
to directly corroborate the empirical results found within this paper. Strict rules of origin and other 
compliance costs may have hampered both export expansion and diversification. 
US-African trade preferences, characterised by softer rules of origin, have been linked to higher 
African exports to the US. However, the possibility that domestic constraints such as weak 
institutional and policy framework, may have prevented the beneficial impacts to be fully 
transmitted to the wider economy. The economic literature has identified supply side constraints 
and poor policy environments on the continent (Frankel 2010) as possible factors leading to this 
result. It is also important to note that the measure of trade openness used in this paper: 
normalized values of   the value of trade (imports plus exports) divided by exports is still a rather 
crude measure, despite its widespread use in empirical analyses of this nature. It this cannot be 
interpreted as a policy variable per se since it is an outcome variable representing a confluence of  
factors (including trade policy factors) which could influence real growth. 
In addition, our results imply that, ceteris paribus, Africa has been gaining even more through 
growth through foreign direct investment and savings than through its trade policy. This implies 
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that implementing further policies which encourage increased FDI and domestic savings and 
strengthening institutions which facilitate the efficient allocation of these resources to productive 
enterprises throughout the economy should be growth inducing for Africa.  
Finally, it is important to note that while recent growth outcomes have been positive and 
encouraging for the continent it must be borne in mind that, by implication, African economies are 
highly susceptible to any reversal in recent trends in their bilateral trade with China. Furthermore 
the interrelationships between bilateral trade outcomes and economic growth may uniquely hold 
over the specific review period. More importantly, on the basis of our results, a potential 
slowdown which adversely affects savings and foreign direct investments could negatively impact 
growth prospects on the continent. The specific circumstances of each African country should be 
carefully and judiciously regarded for policy formulation; including the prospects for industries 
and business to participate in the global value chain, to take advantage of opportunities created by 
the new patterns and structures of international trade. Policy-makers, therefore, need to ensure that 
foreign direct investment and domestic savings are available to be directed to sectors within 
African economies that can help to diversify their exposure to shocks in the global economy to 
which oil and other resource sectors are so susceptible.  A failure to harness domestic and foreign 
investments and to diversify in the product and partner space poses some risk of a return to the 
poor growth outcomes of prior decades.  Finally, given that this paper primarily adopts an 
empirical approach, there is still scope for the application of theoretical modelling techniques to 
underpin the analysis. Testing for the “growth by destination” hypothesis using a theoretical 
approach, therefore still remains fertile grounds for possible future research. 
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